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Overview
• Set out the statutory framework for New 
Zealand’s continuous disclosure (CD) rules
• Examine the CD provisions under NZX’s listing 
rules
• Compare and contrast the New Zealand 
regime with:
– Its predecssor under the NZSE/NZX listing rules
– ASX’s CD regime
– The SEC’s “Regulation Fair Disclosure” (Reg FD) in 
the US 
Statutory Framework
Securities Markets 
and Institutions Bill
Introduced November 
2001 (Dalziel)
Other Acts
Securities Markets 
Amendment Act 2002
Commenced 1 
December 2002
Securities Act 1988
“Securities Markets 
Act 1988”
Renamed and 
amended Securities 
Act 1988, now 
including CD rules 
(inter alia)NZX Listing Rules
As implemented 1 
December 2002, 
replacing previous 
NZSE/NZX rules
New Zealand’s 
(NZX’s) CD regime
Securities Markets Act 1988 (from 2002)
• Presumes that information belongs to all of a pubic issuer’s
investors, instead of to issuers themselves
• Obliges public issuers to:
– Immediately disclose security/issuer-specific, non-public and 
materially price-sensitive information
– Avoid the development or subsistence of false/distorted markets
• In effect, also prohibits information disclosures to selected 
investors
• Legislation sought to:
– Replace contractual regime with a statutory regime backed by 
Securities Commission and court enforcement/penalties 
– Improve securities regulation to ensure confidence in the New 
Zealand “market”
– Bring New Zealand’s securities regulation in line with Australia’s
Securities Markets Act 1988 – Purpose
• Section 19A – to “provide for appropriate continuous 
disclosure by public issuers of material information
that is not generally available to the market.”
• Criteria relevant to implementation of that purpose:
– Appropriate investor protection
– Integrity and international competitiveness of listed markets
– Ongoing cost-benefit analysis
– Consistency and predictability
– Avoiding unfair advantage from disclosure to selected investors
– Keeping listed markets in business
– Supporting the co-regulatory model
– International best practice
– “CER”
Securities Markets Act 1988 – Provisions
• Do unto your issuers or the Minister shall do unto them 
for you – Minister can recommend regulations if 
satisfied that registered exchanges’ CD listing rules are 
failing to achieve the 19A purpose
• Where no such regulations are in place – public issuers 
required to make continuous disclosures pursuant to 
continuous disclosure provisions of registered 
exchanges’ listing rules (19B)
• Otherwise public issuers required to make such 
disclosures as regulated, with possible exceptions and 
exemptions (19C)
Securities Markets Act 1988 – Definitions
• Public issuers – issuers of securities traded on 
“registered exchanges” (as defined in the SMA)
• Continuous disclosure provisions – Act is non-
prescriptive; fleshed out in NZX’s listing rules
• Mirrors ASX listing rule definitions in respect of:
– Material information
– Information generally available to the market
Securities Markets Act 1988 – Definitions
• Material information (19E(1)) – that which:
“a reasonable person would expect, if it were generally 
available to the market, to have a material effect on the price or 
value of listed securities of the public issuer …”
• Information is generally available to the market if 
directly or indirectly (i.e. by way of deduction, etc):
– It is made known in a way that it would catch the attention of 
habitual investors, and a reasonable period of time has passed 
since it was so made known; OR
– Habitual investors could readily obtain such information
NZX Listing Rule 10 – As at 10 May 2006
• Material information defined as in the SMA
• NZX issuers required to do three things:
– Immediately release material information to NZX upon its 
directors/executive officers becoming aware of such information 
(subject to “out clause”)
– Not disclose that information to others prior to disclosing it to 
NZX
– Release material information to NZX to prevent the development 
or subsistence of a market for the issuer’s securities that is 
materially influenced by false or misleading information from that 
issuer or from parties giving the information substantial credibility
NZX Listing Rule 10 – cont’d
• The “out clause” re immediate disclosure (cf ASX listing 
rules; not found in the SMA itself):
– Reasonable person would not expect the information to be 
disclosed AND
– The information is confidential AND
– One or more of the following applies:
• Release would break the law
• Information concerns incomplete proposal or negotiation
• Information is supposition or insufficiently determinate
• Information is generated for internal management purposes
• Information is a trade secret
• Principal – if in doubt, disclose
Comparisons and Contrasts
• Like previous listing rules:
– “Relevant information” similar to material information
– Disclosures to selected investors to be avoided
– Issuers required to release relevant information to NZX:
• To avoid false or misleading markets
• No later than it is released to parties who might trade on it
• Once it is no longer more valuable to the issuer to keep that 
information confidential …
• But previous listing rules differed from current ones:
– Information belonged to issuers for their own benefit
– Disclosures to non-entitled parties were prohibited
Comparisons and Contrasts – cont’d
• New Zealand’s current regime modelled on the 
ASX’s CD listing rules (first introduced in 1994)
• New Zealand’s regime differs to the US’ Reg FD 
(implemented by the SEC in 2000):
– Motivated due to concerns about disclosure fairness, 
not disclosure adequacy
– Does not mandate CD per se, but instead prohibits 
disclosures to some investors in preference to others
– Quarterly reporting is the closer US analogue to CD
1The Impact of Continuous 
Disclosure on the Quality and 
Quantity of Earnings Forecasts
Keitha Dunstan
Gerry Gallery
Thu Phuong Truong
2Motivation
Limited NZ and international evidence on the 
effectiveness of alternative corporate disclosure 
regimes
Recent introduction of the statutory sanctions to 
support NZX’s Continuous Disclosure (CD) 
Listing Rules assumes the new regime will lead to 
better outcomes 
↓
Provides an ideal opportunity to examine the 
change in effectiveness of a CD Regime
3Research Objective Study One
What impact has the new CD Regime had 
on the disclosure behavior of NZ listed 
companies?
Focus: comparing the quantity and quality of 
management earnings forecasts (MEFs) 
disclosed in announcements to NZX in the 
pre- & post-statutory sanction periods 
4Research Objective
Advantages of MEFs
1. Desirable properties of MEFs – frequency, timeliness 
and quality can be readily evaluated ex post through 
periodic financial reports
2. NZX specifically requires the disclosure of a material 
change in a listed entity’s earnings  expectation
3. Avoids using noisy alternatives such as disclosure 
indices and market-based proxies (e.g. returns,  price 
volatility, bid-ask spread, etc.)
5What are the CD Objectives? 
Continuous disclosure: “timely advice to the market 
of information required to keep the market informed 
of events and developments as they occur” (NZX 
Guidance Note on CD)
?Two principle objectives: 
? an informed market (between periodic reports) 
? avoidance of unfair access to information (i.e. 
prevention selective disclosure & insider trading)
?Differs from other statutory regimes e.g. Reg. FD  
6Disclosure Theory/Literature
Based on the voluntary disclosure literature: 
?Managers balance conflicting interests in deciding 
to disclose or withhold information 
?Decision is strategically driven and influenced by 
various factors including a perceived need to:
? align expectations (Ajinkya and Gift, 1984) 
? avoid litigation or reputation costs (Skinner, 1994 and
Kasznik & Lev, 1995)
? reduce cost of capital (Frankel, McNichols & Wilson, 1995)
? meet management incentives (Aboody & Kasznik, 2000)
? comply with the legal regime (Baginski et. al., 2002, Gallery 
et. al., 2002, Chan et. al., 2004)
7Hypotheses
Regulatory intervention impacts the 
disclosure frequency decision
H1: The frequency of management earnings 
forecasts in NZX announcements increases in 
the post-statutory sanctions period compared 
to the pre-statutory sanctions period
8Hypotheses
Regulatory intervention impacts the 
disclosure timing decision
H2: The frequency of non-routine 
management earnings forecasts in NZX 
announcements increases in the post-statutory 
sanctions period compared to the pre-
statutory sanctions period.
9Hypotheses
Regulatory intervention impacts 
the disclosure content (quality) 
decision
H3: Firms release a greater number of higher 
quality management earnings forecasts in 
NZX announcements in the post-statutory 
sanctions period compared to the pre-
statutory sanctions period.
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Sample & Data
? Study period: 
? Pre-CD Regime period: 1 July 1999 to 30 Nov. 2002
? Post-CD Regime period: 1 Dec. 2002 to 31 Aug. 
2004
? Data Source:
? NZX disclosures sourced from Datex Database
? Sample (Table 1):
? 94 listed NZ firms with 1353 documents containing 
706 earnings forecasts (of varying precision)
11
Classification Method
MEFs are mapped across the financial 
year and are coded according to the 
following categories:
? Non-routine/Routine forecasts
? Good/Bad News forecasts
? General impression/Open-ended/Range/Point 
forecasts
? Forecast Horizon
? Accuracy
12
Research Models
H1 Disclosure Frequency:
Tested using a pooled cross-sectional logit model (Model 1):
DISCLOSE = α +β1 PRE_POST + β2 ESIGN∆ + β3|EPS∆| +β4EVOL + 
β5MCAP + β6XLIST + β7PRE_POSTX + β8GROWTH +ε
DISCLOSE = frequency a NZX announcement contains a MEF; 
PRE_POST =  pre/post  1 Dec. 2002 0/1 indicator;
ESIGN∆ = negative/positive current period EPS 0/1 indicator;
|EPS∆| = Ln(EPS/share price);
EVOL =  Ln (Std dev of EPS over the previous 3 fiscal years); 
MCAP  = Ln (MVE); 
XLIST = cross-listed 0/1 indicator variable;
PRE_POSTX =  PRE_POST x XLIST; 
GROWTH = Ln(MVE/BVE)
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Research Models
H2 & H3 Forecast Attributes 
(Timeliness & Content):
Tested using pooled cross-sectional logit, OLS, ordered logit models:
Forecast Attribute = α + β1PRE_POST + β2 ENEWS + β3|EPS∆| + β4EVOL 
+ β5MCAP + β6XLIST + β7PRE_POSTX + β8GROWTH + ε
Forecast Attribute = Routine/Non-routine (EVENT)  (H2)
= Forecast Horizon (FHORIZON) (H3)
= Forecast precision (PRECISE) (H3)
ENEWS = 1/0 indicator variable if forecast indicates an expected positive/negative EPS 
change
(* PRECISE is added to the FHORIZON model &  
EVENT, FHORIZON are added to the PRECISE model) 
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Results – Table 2
Frequencies of Sample Firms Providing Earnings Forecasts – 1 July 1999 to 31 August 2004 
Classified by Yearly Periods, News Type, and Event Type 
No. of 
Disclosures 
per period 
No. of 
Firm 
Periods 
Good 
News 
Bad  
News 
Quan Qual Non-
routine 
Event 
Routine 
Event 
Total 
Disclosu
res 
 
Full Sample 
(N=706) 
453 572 134 157 549 95 611 706 
Pre-Period   
(N = 410) 
292 335 75 57 353 41 369 410 
Post-Period  
(N = 296) 
 
161 237 59 100 196 54 242 296 
 %Preempt. %Tot. %Tot. %Tot. %Tot. %Tot. %Tot. 
 
 
Pre-Period   67% 82% 18% 14% 86% 10% 90%  
Post-Period  74% 80% 20% 34% 66% 18% 82%  
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Results – Table 3 
 
 
Earnings Forecasts Classified by Negative and Positive Earnings Change Partitions 
For All Sample Firm Years and Pre & Post Regime Change Firm Years 
 Pre-Period Post-Period 
Earnings  
Change 
No. of 
Firm 
Periods 
No. (%) of Periods Pre-
empted by an Earnings 
Forecast  
No. of 
Firm 
Periods 
No. (%) of Periods Pre-
empted by an Earnings 
Forecast  
< -0.1 28 19 (32.14%) 18 12 (66.67%) 
-0.1 to -0.05 23 16 (69.57%) 10 7 (70.00%) 
-0.05 to -0.01 37 24 (64.86%) 21 18 (85.71%) 
-0.01 to 0 27 13 (48.15%) 12 10 (83.33%) 
0 to 0.01 37 24 (64.86%) 19 14 (73.68%) 
0.01 to 0.05 68 44 (64.71%) 40 32 (80.00%) 
0.05 to 0.1 26 19 (73.08%) 13 11 (84.61%) 
> 0.1 46 33 (71.74%) 28 15 (53.57%) 
N 292 192 (65.75%) 161 119 (73.91%) 
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Results –Table 4
 
Variable Mean Median 
Pre-Period Regime Sub-sample (N = 469) 
EPS Change 0.161 0.040 
|EPS∆| -3.275 -3.231 
EPS Volatility 0.362 0.047 
EVOL -2.835 -3.063 
MV 2332660 125350 
MCAP 12.053 11.739 
MV/BV 1.703 1.300 
GROWTH 0.258 0.262 
FHORIZON* 212.41 228.00 
Post-Period Regime Sub-sample (N = 237) 
EPS Change  0.113 0.031 
|EPS∆| -3.343 -3.483 
EPS Volatility 0.197 0.047 
EVOL -2.861 -3.049 
MV 1561409 155700 
MCAP 12.204 11.956 
MV/BV 1.872 1.305 
GROWTH 0.355 0.266 
FHORIZON* 184.51 152.00 
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Results – Tables 5-8
Summary of Table 5 to 8 (Full Sample) 
Variable  DISCLOSE EVENT FHORIZON PRECISE 
Intercept -0.452 -0.261 202.846** 1.636 
PRE_POST 0.356** 1.135** -20.361* 0.771** 
ESIGN∆ 0.245*    
ENEWS  -1.680** 39.553** -0.582** 
|EPS∆| -0.113* -0.100 -0.313 -0.283** 
EVOL 0.235** 0.347** -5.500 0.359** 
MCAP 0.078* -0.023 -3.363 -0.216** 
XLIST -0.426** 0.050 23.081* 0.696* 
PRE_POSTX -0.382 -0.017 11.059 0.505 
GROWTH -0.251** -0.230 4.895 0.331* 
PRECISE   -18.354**  
EVENT    0.847** 
FHORIZON    -0.003** 
N 1353 706 706 706 
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Results: Tables 5-8
Bad News sub-sample
Summary of Table 5 to 8 (Negative/Bad News Sub-Sample) 
Variable  DISCLOSE EVENT FHORIZON PRECISE 
Intercept -0.974 -1.105 108.333 0.396 
PRE_POST 0.738** 1.108* 0.175 1.309** 
ESIGN∆     
ENEWS     
|EPS∆| -0.014 0.073 6.117 0.027 
EVOL 0.146* 0.225 -15.340 -0.151 
MCAP 0.125* 0.087 4.748 -0.081 
XLIST -0.846** -0.736 16.599 -0.279 
PRE_POSTX -0.326 0.289 -11.988 1.060 
GROWTH -0.187* -0.490 3.659 -0.156 
PRECISE   -33.576**  
EVENT    0.643 
FHORIZON    -0.007** 
N 543 134 134 134 
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Findings Study One
• We find limited improvement in the quantity and quality 
of earnings forecasts following the introduction of the 
statutory-backed CD Regime
– Improvement mostly driven by firms expecting negative 
earnings change
– Large number of periods not pre-empted with at least one 
forecast
– Large number of qualitative & routine forecasts, forecast 
horizon has declined and accuracy has not improved
• Little evidence of a “continuous” disclosure culture  
arising from the new CD regime
20
Research Objective Study Two
What impact has the new CD Regime 
had on the capital market 
interpretation of the disclosure 
behaviour of NZ listed companies?
?Focus: comparing the capital market 
reaction to management earnings 
forecasts (MEFs) and earnings 
announcements (EAs) in the pre- & post-
statutory sanctions periods
21
Literature Review
• Empirical research from the U.S. and 
Australia documents the capital market 
reaction to MEFs 
• Most studies document a greater capital 
market reaction for bad news than good 
news MEFs
• Capital market reaction varies depending 
on investor confidence in the quality of 
information disclosed 
22
Hypotheses
Regulatory intervention impacts the
capital market reaction to MEFs
? H1: The capital market reaction to management 
earnings forecasts is less in the post-statutory sanction 
period than in the pre-statutory sanction period
? H2: The asymmetrical capital market reaction to bad 
and good news management earnings forecasts is less 
in the post-statutory sanction period than in the pre-
statutory sanction period
? H3: The asymmetrical capital market reaction to non-
routine and routine management earnings forecasts is 
less in the post-statutory sanction period than in the 
pre-statutory sanction period
23
Hypotheses
Regulatory intervention impacts the
capital market reaction to EAs
?H4: The capital market reaction to preliminary 
earnings announcements is less in the post-
statutory sanction period than in the pre-
statutory sanction period
?H5: The asymmetrical capital market reaction to 
bad and good news preliminary earnings 
announcements is less in the post-statutory 
sanction period than in the pre-statutory 
sanction period
24
Sample & Data
Study Period: 
? Pre-CD Regime period: 31 Jan. 1999 to 30 Nov. 
2002
? Post-CD Regime period: 1 Dec. 2002 to 30 Sep. 
2005
Data Source:
?NZX disclosures sourced from Datex Database
? Sample: 
? 94 listed NZ firms with 619 firm years and 2603 
documents containing 701 earnings forecasts
25
Classification Method
MEFs are mapped across the financial
year and are coded according to the
following categories:
?Non-routine/Routine
?Good/Neutral/Bad News
?General impression/Open-
ended/Range/Point
?Low/Medium/High Level of Certainty
?Forecast Horizon
26
Research Models
H1, H2 & H3 Capital market reaction to
MEFs:
Tested using a pooled cross-sectional OLS 
model:
ABSCAR it = α + β1PRE_POSTit + β2 ENEWSit + 
β3|EPS∆|it + β4EVOLit + β5EVENTit + 
β6PRECISEit + β7CERTAINTYit + β8HORIZONit + 
β9MCAPit + β10XLISTit + β11GROWTHit + εit
27
Research Models
H4 & H5 Capital market reaction to EAs
Tested using pooled cross-sectional OLS 
models:
Capital market reaction = α + β1PRE_POSTit + β2
ESIGNit+ β3|EPS∆|it +β4EVOLit + β5MCAPit + 
β6XLISTit + β7GROWTHit + εit
Capital market reaction = ABSPreDateCAR
= ABSLongWindow
= ABSCombinedWindow
(*FORECAST is added to the ABSPreDateCAR model)
28
Results – Table 2
 
Table 2 
Average Five-Day Market-Adjusted Abnormal Return Associated With 701 Management Earnings 
Forecasts 
Full Sample (N = 701) Bad News Good News t-stats between Bad/Good
All Earnings Forecasts -5.2656% 1.1017% 2.4255* 
Routine Earnings Forecasts -2.1835% 0.4324% 0.5968 
Non-routine Earnings Forecasts -9.1734% 4.7977% 1.8364^ 
Qualitative Earnings Forecasts -4.1305% 0.6830% 1.1547 
Open-ended Earnings Forecasts -7.4597% 1.0651% 1.1296 
Range Earnings Forecasts -7.2616% 0.8210% 1.3435 
Point Earnings Forecasts -4.8071% 2.7561% 1.2792 
Pre-CD Regime Period Sub-sample (N=305)    
All Earnings Forecasts -7.7033% 0.8682% 1.9988^ 
Routine Earnings Forecasts -3.7282% 0.6193% 0.4815 
Non-routine Earnings Forecasts -12.7154% 3.5323% 1.823^ 
Qualitative Earnings Forecasts -4.5526% 0.7056% 0.8298 
Open-ended Earnings Forecasts -6.1136% 0.3082% 1.0936 
Range Earnings Forecasts -25.5491% 0.2461% 1.805 
Point Earnings Forecasts -10.4263% 2.2850% 0.977 
Post-CD Regime Period Sub-sample (N=396)    
All Earnings Forecasts -3.5755% 1.2969% 1.4227 
Routine Earnings Forecasts -1.1169% 0.2514% 0.4028 
Non-routine Earnings Forecasts -6.7047% 5.2279% 0.568 
Qualitative Earnings Forecasts -3.2862% 0.6563% -0.2786 
Open-ended Earnings Forecasts -8.4693% 1.4705% 0.8313 
Range Earnings Forecasts -2.9587% 0.9399% -0.0027 
Point Earnings Forecasts -2.8805% 2.9917% 1.003 
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Results – Table 3
Table 3 
Average Market-Adjusted Abnormal Returns for 340 Firm Years during Which Earnings News Was Pre-empted 
Full Sample (N=340) Full Sample Negative EPS Change Positive EPS Change t-stat. 
N 340 121 219  
Abnormal Return Cumulated over All Earnings 
Related Announcements for the Year1 -0.6887% -7.0943% 2.8505% 0.9291
Earnings-Announcement-Period Abnormal Return -0.1147% -2.0341% 0.9458% 1.6978^
Pre-CD Regime Period Sub-sample (N=165)     
N 165 58 107  
Abnormal Return Cumulated over All Earnings 
Related Announcements for the Year -1.4618% -8.6886% 2.4556% 0.933 
Earnings-Announcement-Period Abnormal Return 0.1088% -3.0569% 1.8247% 1.0828
Post-CD Regime Period Sub-sample (N=175)     
N 175 63 112  
Abnormal Return Cumulated over All Earnings 
Related Announcements for the Year 0.0402% -5.6266% 3.2278% 0.2991
Earnings-Announcement-Period Abnormal Return -0.3254% -1.0925% 0.1062% -1.0959
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Results – Table 4
 
Variable Mean Median 
Pre-CD Regime Sub-sample (N=305)   
EPS Change* 0.23799 0.04208 
|EPS∆|* -3.10156 -3.16748 
EPS Volatility* 0.28067 0.05318 
EVOL* -2.74689 -2.93399 
MV* 1,334,213,989 121,650,000 
MCAP* 18.81775 18.61666 
MV/BV* 1.58186 1.19961 
GROWTH* 0.20926 0.18199 
FHORIZON* 201 212 
CAR -0.00850 -0.00272 
ABSCAR 0.05746 0.03542 
Post-CD Regime Sub-sample (N=396)   
EPS Change* 0.10706 0.02423 
|EPS∆|* -3.53947 -3.70541 
EPS Volatility* 0.17671 0.04689 
EVOL* -3.00793 -3.06006 
MV* 1,904,834,444 194,740,000 
MCAP* 19.22179 19.08718 
MV/BV* 2.15348 1.58009 
GROWTH* 0.47473 0.45748 
FHORIZON* 187 183 
CAR 0.00162 0.00218 
ABSCAR 0.05287 0.03319 
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Results – Table 5
 
Variable Mean Median 
Pre-CD Regime Sub-sample (N=341)   
EPS Change 0.59714 0.04010 
|EPS∆| -3.21337 -3.21473 
EPS Volatility 0.27442 0.04724 
EVOL -3.01060 -3.05252 
MV* 1,919,897,299 101,000,000 
MCAP* 18.54718 18.43063 
MV/BV* 1.93936 1.17436 
GROWTH* 0.28170 0.17104 
PreDateCAR -0.00302 0.00273 
ABSPreDateCAR* 0.05833 0.03595 
Post-CD Regime Sub-sample (N=278)   
EPS Change 0.13847 0.02912 
|EPS∆| -3.41782 -3.53253 
EPS Volatility 0.27260 0.04689 
EVOL -3.06225 -3.06006 
MV* 1,532,978,417 169,915,000 
MCAP* 18.80275 18.95081 
MV/BV* 2.62249 1.37647 
GROWTH* 0.47347 0.35606 
PreDateCAR -0.00162 -0.00351 
ABSPreDateCAR* 0.04712 0.02883 
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Results - Table 6
Variable Mean Median 
Pre-CD Regime Sub-sample (N=165)   
EPS Change* 0.25949 0.04180 
|EPS∆|* -3.07529 -3.17147 
EPS Volatility 0.26532 0.05330 
EVOL -2.77029 -2.93190 
MV* 1,333,164,266 108,200,000 
MCAP* 18.65466 18.49949 
MV/BV* 1.73090 1.19925 
GROWTH* 0.25209 0.19385 
LongWindow -0.04966 0.01898 
ABSLongWindow* 0.21153 0.11986 
CombinedWindow -0.05647 0.01813 
ABSCombinedWindow 0.23853 0.14194 
Post-CD Regime Sub-sample (N=175)   
EPS Change* 0.14036 0.02619 
|EPS∆|* -3.47439 -3.62788 
EPS Volatility 0.25067 0.04616 
EVOL -2.99052 -3.07559 
MV* 1,686,931,771 192,170,000 
MCAP* 19.19639 19.07389 
MV/BV* 2.17560 1.58009 
GROWTH* 0.47010 0.45748 
LongWindow 0.00657 0.00707 
ABSLongWindow* 0.14195 0.08774 
CombinedWindow 0.01017 0.01033 
ABSCombinedWindow 0.18170 0.13422 
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Results: Table 7 to 10
Summary of Table 7 to 10 
Variable ABSCAR ABSPreDateCAR ABSLongWindow ABSCombinedWindow
Intercept 0.23830** 0.21915** 0.86857** 0.90174** 
PRE_POST -0.01514 -0.09043* -0.10869* -0.07059^ 
ESIGN  -0.03414 -0.11290* -0.13397** 
ENEWS -0.07662*    
|EPS∆| 0.08853^ 0.09906* 0.17356* 0.14320* 
EVOL 0.02389 0.00713 0.10356 0.11484 
EVENT 0.20173**    
PRECISE -0.00257    
CERTAINTY 0.02670    
FHORIZON 0.01968    
MCAP -0.24550** -0.25586** -0.22555** -0.20494** 
XLIST 0.12320* 0.10389* 0.07687 0.10582 
GROWTH 0.00571 0.04397 0.17313** 0.13540 
FORECAST  0.04735   
Adjusted R2 0.07926 0.06899 0.11176 0.08627 
F-Value (6.38384)** (6.57628)** (6.98568)** (5.49143)** 
N 701 619 340 340 
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Results: Table 7-10
Pre-CD Regime Sub-sample
Summary of Table 7 to 10 
Pre-CD Regime Sub-sample 
Variable ABSCAR ABSPreDateCAR ABSLongWindow ABSCombinedWindow 
Intercept 0.17673* 0.24207** 1.30440** 1.32484** 
PRE_POST     
ESIGN  -0.00299 -0.15015* -0.18520** 
ENEWS -0.11167*    
|EPS∆| 0.03926 0.13999* 0.14730^ 0.12073 
EVOL 0.09181 -0.00611 0.20041^ 0.22073^ 
EVENT 0.21191**    
PRECISE 0.00720    
CERTAINTY 0.07101    
FHORIZON 0.05979    
MCAP -0.15415* -0.24968** -0.28363** -0.26050** 
XLIST 0.12031 0.09805 0.16652^ 0.18314^ 
GROWTH -0.00114 0.00408 0.25704** 0.23003** 
FORECAST  0.03798   
Adjusted R2 0.06158 0.06559 0.16714 0.16099 
F-Value (2.93571)** (4.30934)** (6.31796)** (6.08472)** 
N 305 341 165 165 
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Results: Table 7-10
Post-CD Regime Sub-sample
Summary of Table 7 to 10 
Post-CD Regime Sub-sample 
Variable ABSCAR ABSPreDateCAR ABSLongWindow ABSCombinedWindow
Intercept 0.28770** 0.16598** 0.32499* 0.37884^ 
PRE_POST     
ESIGN  -0.10237* -0.01562 -0.02416 
ENEWS -0.02109    
|EPS∆| 0.16730** 0.06086 0.26118* 0.19226* 
EVOL -0.07922 0.00167 -0.12127 -0.09450 
EVENT 0.16529**    
PRECISE -0.01293    
CERTAINTY -0.03787    
FHORIZON -0.04766    
MCAP -0.33252** -0.24977** -0.09876 -0.08634 
XLIST 0.13755* 0.11457 -0.03241 0.03640 
GROWTH 0.00557 0.13405* -0.03462 -0.07149 
FORECAST  0.04616   
Adjusted R2 0.12672 0.05394 0.04553 0.01526 
F-Value (6.68835)** (3.2071)** (2.37545)* (1.44687) 
N 396 278 175 175 
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Concluding Remarks
We find qualified support for the positive
effects of the more onerous disclosure
regime for the New Zealand capital
market
? The capital market no longer placed emphasis on bad news 
forecasts in the post sanction period
? The abnormal market adjusted returns for preliminary earnings 
announcements has diminished in the post sanction period
↓
? The capital market is better informed in a more timely manner 
about earnings related information
? The regulation has indeed improved the efficiency and integrity 
of the capital market
Th
e
 
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
A
u
c
k
l
a
n
d
 
|
N
e
w
 
Z
e
a
l
a
n
d
B
U
S
I
N
E
S
S
 
S
C
H
O
O
L
The impact of disclosure reform 
on the NZX’s financial information 
environment
By Meng Huang, Alastair Marsden and Russell Poskitt
The University of Auckland
ISCR Workshop
Continuous Disclosure
29 June 2006
Th
e
 
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
A
u
c
k
l
a
n
d
 
|
N
e
w
 
Z
e
a
l
a
n
d
B
U
S
I
N
E
S
S
 
S
C
H
O
O
L
2
0
0
6
New Disclosure Regime
In December 2002 the NZX introduced a new disclosure regime for listed 
stocks.
Companies required to immediately release all price-sensitive 
information to investors. 
Prior to 2002, Listing Rule 10.1 required a listed company to treat 
information as an asset, to be used and applied for its overall 
benefit.
New listing rules require that material (i.e. price-sensitive) 
information be disclosed immediately, on the presumption that the 
information belongs to all investors.
There was also statutory backing for the continuous disclosure listing 
rules (amendments to the Securities Markets Act 1988).
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Purpose of the new disclosure 
rules
NZX (2005) argues that the new continuous disclosure rules would:
reduce information costs and information gap between informed 
and uninformed investors, 
assist investors in making informed decisions; and 
enhance confidence in the integrity of the market by removing 
opportunities for insider trading.
Etebari, Tourani-Rad and Gilbert (2004) – study 93 NZ listed companies 
over 1995 – 2001 period. Report that insiders earn significantly large 
abnormal returns on transactions, with gains coming largely from
transactions involving delayed disclosure.
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Impact of the new Continuous 
Disclosure Rules
Two central hypotheses are:
H1: Analysts’ forecast error and dispersion are lower in 
the post-reform period.
and
H2: The information gap is lower in the post-reform 
period.
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Prior research into Information 
Disclosure Regimes
Australia Brown et al. (1999). Analysts’ earnings forecasts did not 
became more accurate or less disperse post the introduction of 
statutory backed continuous disclosure requirements.  
US and 
Reg FD 
 Heflin et al. (2003) – No change in analysts’ earnings forecast 
errors or dispersion after introduction of Reg FD. 
Bailey et al. (2003)  - Analysts’ forecast less accurate after 
introduction of Reg FD. 
Irani and Karamanou (2003) – Dispersion of analysts’ forecasts 
increased post-Reg FD. 
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Informational efficiency of 
stock prices
Australia Brown et al. (1999). Stock prices of small firms better anticipated the 
information content of annual earnings announcements post- the introduction of 
statutory backed continuous disclosure requirements. 
US and 
Reg FD 
Heflin et al. (2003). Deviations between pre- and post-announcement stock 
prices became smaller in the post-Reg FD. 
NZ Poskitt and Yang (2005). Disclosure reforms had no impact on the level of 
informed trading in NZX-listed stocks. 
Dunstan, Gallery and Troung (2005, 2006) –  (i) quality and quantity of 
management forecasts improved particularly for firms reporting unfavourable 
news; and (ii) abnormal market adjusted returns for preliminary earnings 
announcements diminished in the post-statutory regime period.  
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DATA
Data on analysts’ forecast EPS, stock returns and earnings announcements dates – 
IBES / NZX / Datex. 
Our final sample for stocks listed over the 4-year period 1 Jan 2001 to 31 Dec 2004: 
(i) Analysis of analysts’ forecasts - 40 NZSX-listed stocks 
(ii) Analysis of stock price information efficiency - 62 NZSX-listed stocks. 
Pre-reform - 1 January 2001 and 31 December 2002 
Post-reform - 1 January 2003 and 31 December 2004 
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METHODOLOGY
Measure of Analyst Forecast error (FEit) 
it
itit
it P
FEPSAEPS
FE
|| −=          
FEit  = Forecast error for firm i at time t. 
AEPSit  = Actual earnings per share for firm i at time t. 
FEPSit = Mean financial analysts’ earnings forecast (the earnings forecast is measured
using the most recent analysts’ forecasts prior to the announcement date). 
Pit  = stock price at the end of the firm’s fiscal year t for firm i. 
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Measure of Analyst Forecast 
dispersion (FDit)
it
it
it P
SD
FD =           
FDit = forecast dispersion for firm i at time t.  
SDit = the standard deviation of individual analysts’ forecasts. 
Pit =  the stock price at the end of the firm’s fiscal year t for firm i. 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS -
Analysts’ Forecasts
 
Absolute Analyst Forecast Error and Forecast Dispersion 
 Forecast error Forecast dispersion 
 N = 160 
 
N = 151 
 Mean Median 
 
Mean Median 
Pre-reform 
 
0.0253 
 
0.0092 
 
0.0118 
 
0.0063 
 
Post-reform 0.0429 
 
0.0060 
 
0.0072 
 
0.0043 
 
Difference +0.0176 
 
-0.0032 
 
-0.0046 
 
-0.0020 
 
 
p-value 0.26 0.27 0.02 0.01 
No significant difference in analysts’ forecast errors but analysts’ dispersion of 
earnings forecasts decreases. 
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Cross-sectional analysis
itititit
ititititit
eFDLOSSNEGE
ESUPANADAYSMVREFORMFE
++++
+++++=
876
543210
λλλ
λλλλλα
   
ititit
ititititit
eLOSSNEGE
ESUPANADAYSMVREFORMFD
+++
+++++=
76
543210
λλ
λλλλλα
  
Variable Predicted 
sign 
Definition 
REFORM -ve 
 
Dummy variable = 1 if post-reform period, and 0 otherwise 
MV -ve 
 
Natural log of total market cap 
DAYS +ve 
 
 
Log of the number of days by which the forecast precedes 
the earnings announcement 
ANA -ve 
 
Number of analysts generating mean forecasts of earnings  
 
ESUP  +ve 
 
Absolute value of the difference between the current year’s 
EPS and last year’s EPS at time t , divided by the price  
 
NEGE 
+ve 
 
Value of 1 if the current year’s EPS is below last year’s 
EPS, and 0 otherwise 
LOSS +ve 
 
Equals 1 if reported profits are negative and 0 otherwise 
FD +ve 
 
Forecast dispersion 
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Descriptive Statistics for Control 
Variables in the Regressions of 
Absolute Forecast Error and Forecast 
Dispersion
 Mean 
 Overall Pre-reform Post-reform p-value 
 
MV 5.7880 5.6784 5.8975 (0.27) 
 
DAYS 2.4107 2.4338 2.3876 (0.77) 
 
ANA 4.9750 4.9875 4.9625 (0.95) 
 
ESUP 0.0524 0.0364 0.0684 (0.17) 
 
NEGE 0.4313 0.5000 0.3625 (0.08) 
 
LOSS 0.0938 0.0875 0.1000 (0.79) 
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Analyst Forecast Error
Regression of Absolute Analyst Forecast Error on REFORM Indicator and 
Control Variables 
FEit = α 0 + λ 1 REFORM + λ 2 MVit+ λ 3 DAYSit + λ 4 ANAit+ λ 5  ESUPit+  
λ 6 NEGEit + λ 7 LOSSit + λ 8 FDit + eit 
 
  Model 1 OLS Model 1 Fixed effects 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient (t 
stats) 
Coefficient (t stats) 
Constant 
 
0.0179 
(0.98) 
-0.0030 
(-0.03) 
REFORM -ve 
 
0.0015 
(0.22) 
0.0022 
(0.26) 
MV -ve 
 
-0.0028 
(-1.04) 
0.0001 
(0.01) 
DAYS +ve 
 
-0.0021 
(-0.60) 
-0.0030 
(-0.63) 
ANA -ve 
 
Not Sig. 
 
Not Sig. 
 
ESUP +ve 
 
0.5257 
(21.51)*** 
0.5022 
(15.38)*** 
NEGE +ve 
 
-0.0030 
(-0.43) 
-0.0070 
(-0.82) 
LOSS +ve 
 
0.0827 
(6.33)*** 
0.1001 
(5.84)*** 
FD +ve 
 
0.3327 
(1.01) 
0.4938 
(0.98) 
 
Adjusted R2  0.845 0.870 
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Analyst Forecast Dispersion
Regression of Forecast Dispersion on REFORM Indicator and Control Variables 
FDit = α 0 + λ 1 REFORM + λ 2 MVit+ λ 3 DAYSit+ λ 4 ANAit+ λ 5 ESUPit + 
 λ 6 NEGEit + λ 7 LOSSit + eit 
 
  Model 2 OLS Model 2 Fixed effects 
Variable Predicted Coefficient (t stats) Coefficient (t stats) 
Constant 
 
0.0110 
(3.55)*** 
0.0133 
(2.08)** 
REFORM -ve 
 
-0.0050 
(-2.91)*** 
-0.0041 
(-2.76)*** 
MV -ve 
 
Sig. -ve 
 
Sig. -ve 
 
DAYS +ve 
 
0.0012 
(1.38) 
0.0002 
(0.19) 
ANA -ve 
 
-0.0009 
(-2.24)** 
0.0003 
(0.48) 
ESUP +ve 
 
0.0122 
(1.96)* 
-0.0036 
(-0.55) 
NEGE +ve 
 
0.0017 
(0.99) 
0.0013 
(0.79) 
LOSS +ve 
 
0.0130 
(4.11)*** 
0.0077 
(2.31)** 
 
Adjusted R2  0.251 0.623 
 
Th
e
 
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
A
u
c
k
l
a
n
d
 
|
N
e
w
 
Z
e
a
l
a
n
d
B
U
S
I
N
E
S
S
 
S
C
H
O
O
L
2
0
0
6
Informational Efficiency of 
Stock Prices
We compute the absolute cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) 
for each stock between days -10 to +10. 
 
Day  Day Day Day 
-210  -10 0 +10 
 Estimation period  Event window period  
     
 Market model  Earnings Announcement  
 
 
Abnormal Return (AR) = Actual Return – Expected Return 
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Informational Efficiency of 
Stock Prices
Measurement of cumulative abnormal return (CAR)
CAR [-2, +3] = ARday-2 + ARday-1 + ARday0 + ARday+1 +
ARday+2 + AR day+3
ACAR [-2, +3] = Absolute value of CAR [-2, +3].
A higher (lower) ACAR implies a larger (smaller) 
information gap.
We expect lower ACARs should be observed in the post-
reform period compared to the pre-reform period.
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Informational Efficiency of 
Stock Price
Absolute Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) 
Pre- and Post-reform Earnings Announcements 
 
Event 
window 
period 
ACAR [-2, +3] ACAR [-2,+4] 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
 
Pre-reform 
 
0.0584 
 
0.0351 
 
0.0583 
 
0.0340 
 
 
Post-reform 0.0415 
 
0.0305 
 
0.0430 
 
 
0.0313 
 
 
Difference -0.0169 
 
-0.0046 
 
-0.0153 
 
 
-0.0027 
 
 
p-value 
 
0.025 
 
0.152 
 
0.036 
 
0.255 
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Informational Efficiency of 
Stock Price
Price Discovery Pre-reform v Post-reform 
 
Mean Absolute Cummulative Abnormal Return
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
Day
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Cross-sectional analysis –
cont.
ACARi,t = α x,0 +λ 1 REFORM + λ 2 MBit + λ 3 LEVit + λ 4 MVit +  
λ 5 ESUPit + λ 6 LOSSit + λ 7 NEGCARit + ei,t 
 
Variable Predicted
sign 
Definition 
REFORM 
 
-ve 
 
Dummy variable = 1 if post-reform period, and 0 
otherwise 
MB 
 
+ve 
 
Market to book value of equity  
LEV 
 
+ve 
 
Ratio of total liabilities to total assets  
MV 
 
-ve 
 
Natural log of market cap  
 
ESUP 
+ve 
 
 
Absolute value of the difference between the current 
year’s EPS and last year’s EPS at time t , divided by the 
price  
LOSS 
 
+ve 
 
Equals 1 if reported profits are negative and 0 otherwise 
NEGCAR 
 
+ve 
 
Equals 1 if the cumulative abnormal return over days -10 
to -3 is negative, and 0 otherwise, 
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Informational Efficiency of 
Stock Price
Regression of Absolute Cumulative Abnormal Returns on the  
REFORM Indicator and Control Variables 
 
ACARi,t = α x,0 +λ 1 REFORM + λ 2 MBit + λ 3 LEVit + λ 4 MVit + λ 5 ESUPit + λ 6 LOSSit + 
λ 7 NEGCARit + ei,t 
 
Event window period [-2,+3] [-2,+4] 
Variable Predicted
sign 
 OLS Fixed 
effects 
 OLS Fixed 
effects 
Intercept 
  
0.0587 
(3.81)*** 
-0.0393 
(-0.49) 
0.0690 
(4.60)*** 
0.0532 
(0.69) 
REFORM 
 
-ve 
 
-0.0156 
(-2.17)** 
-0.0153 
(-2.28)** 
-0.0142 
(-2.03)** 
-0.0128 
(-2.00)** 
MB 
 
+ve 
 
-0.0016 
(-1.69)* 
-0.0010 
(-0.49) 
-0.0008 
(-0.89) 
0.0019 
(1.00) 
LEV 
 
+ve 
 
0.0298 
(1.79)* 
0.0854 
(1.93)* 
0.0215 
(1.33) 
0.0600 
(1.43) 
MV 
 
-ve 
 
-0.0045 
(-1.76)* 
0.0030 
(0.27) 
-0.0056 
(-2.25)** 
-0.0086 
(-0.83) 
ESUP 
 
+ve 
 
0.0082 
(1.51) 
0.0087 
(1.38) 
0.0099 
(1.87)* 
0.0088 
(1.47) 
LOSS 
 
+ve 
 
0.0339 
(2.95)*** 
0.0140 
(1.03) 
0.0259 
(2.32)** 
0.0067 
(0.52) 
NEGCAR 
 
+ve 
 
0.0074 
(2.08)** 
0.0174 
(2.30)** 
0.0106 
(1.48) 
0.0142 
(1.97)** 
 
Adjusted R2  0.109  0.092  
F test for no 
fixed effects   1.85***  2.11*** 
n  248 248 248 248 
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Informational Efficiency of 
Stock Price
Regression of Absolute Cumulative Abnormal Returns on the  
REFORM Indicator and Control Variables 
ACARi,t = α x,0 +λ 1 REFORM + λ 2 MBit + λ 3 LEVit + λ 4 MVit + λ 5 ESUPit + λ 6 LOSSit + 
λ 7 NEGCARit + ei,t 
 Small firms Large Firms 
Event window period [-2,+3] [-2,+3] 
Variable Predict
sign 
 OLS Fixed 
effects 
 OLS Fixed 
effects 
Intercept 
  
0.0801 
(2.86)*** 
0.0951 
(1.86)* 
0.0141 
(0.43) 
0.1630 
(1.03) 
REFORM 
 
-ve 
 
-0.0202 
(-2.15)** 
-0.0224 
(-2.73)*** 
-0.0106 
(-0.95) 
-0.0048 
(-0.44) 
MB 
 
+ve 
 
-0.0026 
(-1.19) 
-0.0037 
(-1.56) 
-0.0017 
(-1.47) 
0.0029 
(0.86) 
LEV 
 
+ve 
 
0.0075 
(0.38) 
-0.0057 
(-0.10) 
0.0488 
(1.53) 
0.1630 
(2.42)** 
MV 
 
-ve 
 
-0.0050 
(-0.81) 
0.0164 
(1.41) 
0.0001 
(0.00) 
-0.0343 
(-1.54) 
ESUP 
 
+ve 
 
0.0062 
(1.10) 
0.0099 
(1.76)* 
0.0275 
(1.29) 
0.0004 
(0.02) 
LOSS 
 
+ve 
 
0.281 
(1.92)* 
0.0024 
(0.14) 
0.0288 
(1.41) 
0.0434 
(1.92)* 
NEGCAR 
 
+ve 
 
0.0129 
(1.33) 
0.0186 
(2.07)** 
0.0242 
(1.49) 
0.0209 
(1.73)* 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.073  0.089  
F test for no fixed 
effects 
 
 2.68***  1.61** 
n  124 124 124 124 
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CONCLUSIONS
Our results suggest the reforms were associated with 
an improvement in the flow of information to investors.
No change in analysts’ forecast errors but analyst 
forecast dispersion reduced.
ACARs around the earnings announcement date 
event window periods are generally lower in the 
post-reform period; and
Impact of the reforms with respect to information 
efficiency was greatest for small firms. 
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BUT other impacts of the new 
disclosure rules ??
Commentators of the reform (Wilkinson, 2003: Gaynor, 2002, 
2003) argued:
The prohibition on selective disclosure practices would 
diminish the role that analysts play in ensuring that stocks 
are priced efficiently. Mohanram and Sunder (2006) – post 
Reg FD analysts reduce coverage of well followed firms.
Investors would be inundated with a flood of information. 
This would result in larger price shocks and higher price 
volatility; and
Significant problems in complying with the new disclosure 
rules.
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Do the NZ disclosure rules 
increase share price volatility?
Fisher and Paykel Appliances 
Date Closing Share Price Announcement 
1 Feb 2005 $3.99 nil 
2 Feb 2005 $3.50 Profit downgrade. Y/E March 2005 
profit between $63 to $68 million 
21 April 2005 $2.63 nil 
18 May 2005 $2.75 nil 
19 May 2005 $2.86 Actual year end 31 March 2005 profit 
equal to $68.56 million 
20 May 2005 $3.10 nil 
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Fisher and Paykel Appliances
 
FPA - Share price vs Market Index
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Capital market index FPA share price
Profit downgrade
Actual year end profit 
announcement
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Feltex
Date Closing 
Share Price 
Announcement 
22 Feb 2005 $1.69 nil 
23 Feb 2005 $1.64 Net surplus for 6 months ended Dec 2004 was 
$12.2 million. Despite the Group not meeting the 
projected sales and the likelihood of the continuing 
strong NZ dollar, EBITDA and net profit 
projections for the year remain achievable 
24 Feb 2005 $1.62 nil 
31 March 2005 $1.50 nil 
1 April 2005 $1.04 Sales for the full year are now projected to be 
between $295 million and $305 million. This is 
below the previous guidance provided in the 
interim report of between $310 million and $315 
million. 
Net profit after tax is now projected to be between 
$15 million and $16 million for the year ending 30 
June 2005. This is between $8 million and $9 
million less than the previous projection. 
4 April 2005 $0.86 nil 
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Feltex share price movements
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Capital market index Feltex share price
Profit downgrade
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Does enhanced disclosure rules 
increase share price volatility?
Prior empirical research in other countries mixed. Why? 
Lee and Liu (2006) argue stock prices and volatility influenced by “noise” and 
“information” 
More price information Decrease in volatility since more information reduces 
noise or deviation from fundamental value. 
More price information Increases volatility since greater information flows 
leads to more “continuous” price changes. 
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Is the continuous disclosure regime 
likely to prevent informed traders 
earning abnormal profits?
Marsden, Poskitt and Wang, 2006, An empirical analysis of 
the NZX’s price query system.
We examine the price query system used by the NZX to 
monitor compliance with its continuous disclosure regime.
Do “unexplained” price movements detected by the NZX’s
surveillance systems reflect informed or speculative 
trading?
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Is the continuous disclosure regime 
likely to prevent informed traders 
earning abnormal profits?
Average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for companies that announced 
“no news” in response to a NZX query of a price increase. Day 0 is the date the 
price query was issued. 
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Is the continuous disclosure regime 
likely to prevent informed traders 
earning abnormal profits?
Average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for companies that announced 
“no news” in response to a NZX query of a price decrease. Day 0 is the date the 
price query was issued. 
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We interpret the absence of a full reversal to indicate that prices are based on
information-based trading rather than speculative trading. 
